The roots of a war are rarely simple.
In
Afghanistan what at first looked like retaliation turns to be the first preemptive
resource war of the 21st century.
By Greg Guma
As
troops and planes headed toward Afghanistan more than a decade ago, few people initially
questioned the reasons for that military engagement. An enemy that didn't hesitate
to take thousands of civilian lives had attacked the nation's capital and
brought down New York's tallest buildings. The identity of the chief
"evildoer" also seemed self-evident: Osama bin Laden, whose al Qaeda
network had struck the US before and was being sheltered in Afghanistan by the
Taliban.
In
the wake of such an outrage, how could anyone doubt that a "war on
terrorism" was just and necessary?
But
the roots of war are rarely simple, and, as time passed, other motives for
military action slowly came into focus. As it turns out, strikes against
Afghanistan were in the works before the attacks. Like the Gulf War ten years
before, the rationale was also, if not mainly, rooted in a struggle over access
to oil and gas, in this case huge finds in the Caspian Sea Basin. The only
thing missing was a plausible reason.
What
looked like retaliation was really the first preemptive resource war of the
21st century. More than a decade later it shows no signs of ending.
For
the major energy companies, the Caspian is "el Dorado." North of the
Persian Gulf, and including Russia, Iran, and several former republics of the
Soviet Union, it is estimated to contain the world's second or third largest
reserves of petroleum, along with a vast supply of natural gas. The region is
landlocked, however, so any energy found there must move to market by rail or
pipeline through adjacent, often unstable states.
Despite
various intra-state conflicts, complex geopolitics and considerable risks, the
majors –particularly Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP Amoco, and Royal Dutch/Shell, along
with Norway's Statoil, France's Elf Aquitaine, Italy's Agip, Russia's Lukoil,
and the China National National Petroleum Corporation – began acquiring
development rights and preparing for production in the early 1990s. Offshore
drilling operations were underway in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and set to commence
elsewhere. Major firms were also investing significantly in the future
construction of oil and gas pipelines to distant ports and refineries. By 2010,
the world's leading energy concerns expected to invest at least $50 billion in
production and transportation.
The
first big move was a $20 billion joint venture between Chevron and Kazakhstan,
signed in 1993 to develop the huge Tenzig oil field on the Caspian coast. Three
years later, ExxonMobil purchased a 25 percent share from the government. The
Caspian Pipeline Consortium, including the Tenzig partners and Russia, was
expected to carry 750,000 barrels a day to the Black Sea coast.
Another
consortium focused on Azerbaijan's offshore fields. In 1994, BP Amoco, Lukoil,
Unocal, Penzoil, Statoil and others joined with SOCAR, Azerbaijan's state oil company,
to form the Azerbaijan International Operating Company. Bush family adviser
James A. Baker III, who subsequently spearheaded George W. Bush's victory in
the Florida election dispute, headed the US law firm representing this
consortium, and sat on the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce advisory council,
as did Vice President Cheney before him.
Before
their investments could produce profitable results, however, critical
roadblocks had to be removed. The biggest was how to get the oil and gas from
production sites to markets. Since the US wanted to avoid relying on existing
Soviet-era pipelines new ones would have to be constructed.
Prior
to the 9/11 attacks, the US government's preferred future route for oil and
gas, known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, went from Azerbaijan
through Georgia and then south to the Turkish coast. The policy goal was to
reduce both Georgia's and Azerbaijan's reliance on Russia and bring the
southern Caucasus into the US fold. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice
was a former director of Chevron, a lynchpin of the BTC consortium with
extensive operations in Azerbaijan. Until 2000, Vice President Cheney was chief
executive at Halliburton Co., a 2001 finalist to bid on engineering work in the
Turkish sector of the route.
Some
companies showed more interest in a less expensive route to the Persian Gulf
through Iran. But this clashed with official US policy, including a 1995
executive order prohibiting US business with Iran, as well as the 1996 Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act, which specifically limited oil investments. A third option
was a pipeline from the Dauletebad gas fields in eastern Turkmenistan south
through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, a route across western Afghanistan. But
after 1995 that meant dealing with the Taliban, a repressive regime locked in
civil war.
Opening Shots
Negotiations
began in the early 1990s when energy giants, including ExxonMobil, Texaco,
Unocal, BP Amoco, Shell and Enron, paid top officials in Kazakhstan to secure
equity rights in its huge oil reserves (then estimated up to 92 billion
barrels). Unwilling to meet Russia's price for use of its pipelines, the
companies promised production and pipeline investments of $35 billion.
Turkmenistan,
with possible reserves of up to 80 billion barrels of oil and 155 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, didn't want to be left out of this new Great Game.
Thus, during a US visit in March 1993, President Niyazov hired former US
National Security Advisor Alexander Haig to encourage investments and soften
the US stand on a pipeline via Iran. Within two years, Unocal, one of the
world's largest independent oil and gas producers, was ready to step up. In
June 1995, a Unocal delegation visited Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to discuss
a pipeline through the latter. While visiting New York that October, Turkmeni
President Niyazov signed an Afghan pipeline deal with Unocal and Saudi Arabia's
Delta Oil.
But
another company was also making moves. Prior to Unocal's bid, Bridas, the third
largest oil and gas company in Latin America, struck a deal with Niyazov to
develop gas fields discovered by the Soviets, and even began to export some oil
from the Caspian. In March 1995, to fend off Bridas' competing proposal, US
Ambassador Tom Simmons urged Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to grant
exclusive pipeline rights through her country to Unocal. Bhutto was offended,
cried extortion, and demanded a written apology.
That
August, while touring Afghanistan and Central Asia, US Assistant Secretary of
State Robin Raphel reiterated US interest in the project. By this time,
Gazprom, a Russian company, had signed a deal with Unocal, Delta and
Turkmenistan's state energy company. An exclusive consortium arrangement for
the proposed Afghan pipeline followed in October. By year's end, Iran, Turkey
and Turkmenistan also had struck a deal, this one for Turkey to buy Turkmen gas
through Iran.
While
visiting Kandahar in December 1995, Pakistan's foreign secretary conferred with
the Taliban, which had recently seized control of most of the country, about
the Afghan route. In a statement that was later disavowed, Unocal expressed
support for the Taliban's takeover, suggesting that it would improve prospects
for their project.
From
his base in Afghanistan, bin Laden had already declared jihad against the US,
and the Clinton administration considered him "one of the most significant
financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activity in the world." But that
failed to disrupt US-backed negotiations with his hosts.
Prospecting with the Enemy
Dealing
was the Taliban wasn’t easy. Although a delegation from Afghanistan visited
Washington in February 1997 to secure official recognition and meet with
Unocal, only two months later, on April 8, the new regime unexpectedly
announced that it would award a pipeline contract to the company that started
work first. Unocal president John Imle was baffled by the change but refused to
give up.
During
the summer, a new association, chaired by Unocal, was formed to promote
Turkmenistan-US cooperation. The company's deadline to begin construction of a
pipeline was extended one year; the new "drop dead" date would be
December 1998.
Hoping
to keep its options open, the Clinton administration reevaluated its resistance
to a pipeline through Iran. In order to support US companies and
"friends" in the region, it was now willing to drop objections to a
Persian Gulf route. Encouraged by the shift, Shell entered the negotiations.
The majors finally appeared ready to make their move.
At
this point, the Taliban threw another curve ball, the announcement that it was
leaning toward Bridas to build the pipeline. To press this advantage, the
Argentina-based company joined forces with another major, Amoco. Still in the
game, Unocal made some headway with Pakistan, signing a 30-year pricing
agreement. Despite Bhutto's complaints, US pressure was paying off.
By
October the pieces appeared to be in place. Led by Unocal, Delta, Turkmenistan,
Japan's Itochi Oil, Indonesia Petroleum, Crescent Group, and Hyundai became
partners in the new Central Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd. (CentGas). Gasprom signed
soon after.
Still
hoping to win over the Taliban, Unocal invited a delegation to visit corporate
headquarters in Sugarland, Texas on December 4. The Afghan visitors also met
with State Department officials. But efforts to negotiate a deal failed,
allegedly because the Taliban asked for too much money. Sensing trouble,
Gazprom pulled out of the consortium the following February, leaving Unocal at
risk with a 54 percent interest.
Shortly
thereafter, Unocal Vice President John J. Maresca, later to become a Special
Ambassador to Afghanistan, testified before the US House. Until a single,
unified, and friendly government was in place in Afghanistan, Maresca told
lawmakers on February 12, 1998, a trans-Afghani pipeline would not be built.
The need for a regime change had been put on the table.
A
month later, Unocal announced that its pipeline project was on indefinite hold,
citing financing difficulties and ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. Having
spent $10-15 million already, however, it did not want to give up completely.
Some shareholders had a different idea. At Unocal's annual meeting in June
1998, several of them objected to the Afghan pipeline because of the Taliban's
obvious violations of human rights.
It
was quite clear that Afghanistan was one of bin Laden's major operational
bases. There was also the related warning from CIA Case Officer Robert Baer that
Saudi Arabia was harboring an al-Qaeda cell led by two known terrorists. Yet
the CIA apparently ignored the warnings until August 7, when the US Embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. The trail led to bin Laden.
Thirteen
days later the US retaliated, sending cruise missiles into Al Qaeda camps near
Khost and Jalalabad. Finally getting the message, Unocal officially suspended
its Afghan pipeline plan and pulled out staff throughout the region. Before the
end of 1998, it also withdrew from the $2.9 billion Turkmenistan-to-Turkey
natural gas project, as well as the Afghan pipeline consortium. The reasons
cited were low oil prices, pressure on human rights, and the activities of bin
Laden. Whatever the truth, Unocal's quest for "el Dorado" had been
postponed.
Taking
advantage of an opening, Bridas resumed negotiations with Russia, Turkmenistan,
and Kazakhstan in February 1999. Turkmenistan's foreign minister met with the
Taliban's Mullah Omar to discuss the proposed pipeline. Enron also expressed an
interest. With $3 billion already invested in a plan to build an electrical
generating plant at Dabhol, India, it had recently lost access to plentiful
liquid Natural Gas supplies from Qatar to fuel the plant. A trans-Afghani gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan, terminating at the Pakistani city of Multan near
the Indian border, was a promising alternative. Before the end of April,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and the Taliban sealed an agreement to revive the
project.
During
this period another pipeline opened, linking Baku in Azerbaijan to Supsa on
Georgia's Black Sea coast. Azerbaijan had estimated reserves of 32 billion
barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making it the third
largest potential regional source after Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Despite
the setbacks, US hopes for an eventual link from Georgia to Turkey, a long-term
ally, were still alive.
Dropping the Ball
The
Bush family was well acquainted with the bin Ladens, if not their alleged black
sheep Osama, long before the Saudi renegade declared war on the US and its
allies in Saudi Arabia's royal family. Even after the 1998 embassy attacks, the
relationship remained cordial, largely due to the intercession of the Carlyle
Group, a large US defense contractor. In 1998, and again in 2000, the first
President Bush traveled to Saudi Arabia on behalf of Carlyle, meeting privately
with both the Saudi royals and several of bin Laden's relatives.
This
may help explain why, shortly after moving into the White House in January
2001, the Bush II administration reportedly told the FBI and intelligence
agencies to back off investigations involving the family. The Bureau was interested
in two bin Laden relatives, Abdullah and Omar, who were living near CIA
headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. Bush's blind spot for Saudi Arabia and
contact with the bin Ladens may also explain why no action was taken when, on
January 26, the FBI told the new administration there was clear evidence tying
Al Qaeda to the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.
While
covering a trial of Al Qaeda members in February, 2001 UPI Terrorism
Correspondent Richard Sale noted that the NSA had broken bin Laden's encrypted
communications. Since officials insist that plans for 9/11 must have been in the
work for years, it becomes hard to understand why no hint of what lay ahead was
revealed. National Security Advisor Rice certainly knew something was up. Her
predecessor Sandy Berger had briefed her in detail, advising that she would
"be spending more time on this issue than on any other." Yet,
according to a Newsweek cover story on "What Bush Knew" released in
May 2002, a strategic review "was marginalized and scarcely mentioned in
the ensuing months as the administration committed itself to other priorities,
like national missile defense (NMD) and Iraq."
The
administration didn’t ignore the Taliban, however. On the contrary, it offered
the regime aid. In May 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a $43
million package for the regime, purportedly to assist hungry farmers who were
starving since the destruction of their opium crop on orders from the Taliban's
leaders.
The US was also keen to resolve a decade-long conflict over a mountainous Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. Further fighting there might jeopardize other pipeline investments. Powell personally opened up talks in April between leaders of both countries. After a sit-down in Key West, the two leaders dashed off to Washington for separate sessions with Bush. Leaving little to chance, the administration promised large financial packages to the adversaries if they buried the hatchet. Armenia was in especially tough shape. Three of its four rail links were unused due to closed frontiers with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the economy was in a long-term nose dive.
The US was also keen to resolve a decade-long conflict over a mountainous Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan. Further fighting there might jeopardize other pipeline investments. Powell personally opened up talks in April between leaders of both countries. After a sit-down in Key West, the two leaders dashed off to Washington for separate sessions with Bush. Leaving little to chance, the administration promised large financial packages to the adversaries if they buried the hatchet. Armenia was in especially tough shape. Three of its four rail links were unused due to closed frontiers with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the economy was in a long-term nose dive.
Another
priority was Pakistan, particularly its conflict with India over Kashmir. To
address that, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a former covert
operative who had also worked at the Department of State for Bush I, was sent
to India on a publicized tour. Meanwhile, CIA Director George Tenet quietly
visited Pakistan to meet with General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a
1998 coup. While in Islamabad, Tenet and Musharraf held what was described
later as "an unusually long meeting." Tenet's Pakistani counterpart,
Lt. General Mahmud Ahmad, was also on hand.
A
few months later, Ahmad told an aide to wire transfer $100,000 to Mohammed
Atta, who the FBI later described as the lead terrorist in the suicide
hijackings. Ahmad resigned in October after the transfer was disclosed in India
and confirmed by the FBI. Armitage's peace mission didn’t go any better. A year
later, India and Pakistan had a million troops at their borders and another
regional war looked possible.
By
June 2001, the warning signs were obvious for anyone willing to look. German
intelligence had informed both the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern
terrorists were "planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons
to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture." On June 28,
CIA Director Tenet informed Condoleeza Rice that it was "highly
likely" that a "significant Qaeda attack" would take place
"in the near future."
Before
he reached Genoa in July for the G-8 summit, President Bush obviously
understood the danger. Among others, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had
issued a blunt warning: someone wanted to crash a plane filled with explosives
into the conference site.
Word
of imminent US military action was also leaking out. One scenario appeared on
indiareacts.com, an online magazine, which reported on June 26 that "India
and Iran will 'facilitate' US and Russian plans for 'limited military action'
against the Taliban." The story indicated that US and Russian troops would
do most of the fighting, with the help of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Other
reports said that Tajik and Uzbek forces were training in Alaska and Montana,
and that US rangers were preparing special troops in Kyrgyzstan. The BCC and
Times of India published similar predictions.
During
a meeting with Pakistani and Russian intelligence officers in Berlin, three
former US officials -- Tom Simmons (US Ambassador to Pakistan), Karl Inderfurth
(Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs) and Lee Coldren (State
Department expert on South Asia) -- said much the same thing: The US was
planning military strikes against Afghanistan. They even speculated on a launch
date -- October 2001. Unfortunately, Taliban members may also have been in the
room, or at least privy to what was said, according to Bin Laden - La Verite
Interdite, a French book released after 9/11. In any event, the British press
later reported that Pakistan's secret service relayed the news to the Taliban's
leadership. So much for the element of surprise.
The Plots Thicken
When
revelations eventually surfaced that the US received credible warnings of an
impending attack by Middle Eastern radicals, officials protested that the
information was too vague and that, in any case, President Bush did not know
about the possibility that airplanes might be hijacked until his August 6, 2001
briefing.
A
key element of this defense was that intelligence available to the CIA,
including a report forwarded from Russian intelligence that 25 terrorist pilots
had been training specifically for suicide missions, simply never reached the
president's desk. Neither, apparently, did a July 10 report from the FBI's
Phoenix office. In that document, a well-respected field agent warned that the
unusual number of Middle Eastern men enrolling in US flight schools might be
part of a bin Laden plot. Although his analysis did make it to headquarters,
follow up action was delayed, supposedly due to the expense and staff time
involved.
Was
this a problem of poor coordination? True or not, that was adopted as the most
convenient explanation. But credible evidence points in other directions. To
start, the government had been taking steps toward military action against
Afghanistan for some time, and Bush knew bin Laden was a serious threat.
Surely, coordination wasn't the only issue.
Even
more troubling was a report that the CIA may have made contact with the
"evildoer" two months before the attacks. According to a
controversial story in the French paper Le Figaro, published on October 31,
2001, bin Laden allegedly received treatments for his kidney ailment at a
hospital in Dubai, a Gulf port city, sometime between July 4 and 14. While
there, he reportedly met with someone from the CIA. "Several days later
the CIA officer bragged to his friends about having visited the Saudi
millionaire," the story claimed. "From authoritative sources, this
CIA agent visited CIA headquarters on July 15th, the day after bin Laden's
departure for Quetta."
Although
an intelligence finding issued by President Clinton before leaving office made
him eligible for execution, for some reason bin Laden was allowed to leave
without incident on a private jet, the French newspaper charged.
Among
other things, the story indicated that Arab diplomatic sources and French
intelligence itself believed "precise information was communicated to the
CIA concerning terrorist attacks aimed at American interests in the world,
including its own territory." In a subsequent meeting with French
intelligence, it claimed, US agents asked for details about Algerian activists
connected to bin Laden through Dubai banks. When asked “what do you fear in the
coming days,” they "responded with incomprehensible silence."
Finally,
the French expose charged that "the FBI discovered certain plans that had
been put together between the CIA and its 'Islamic friends' over the years. The
meeting in Dubai is, so it would seem, consistent with 'a certain American
policy.'"
Was
any of this true? Le Figaro claimed to have confirmed bin Laden's visit with
hospital staff. The next day, however, several of those quoted issued denials,
and the CIA insisted that no meeting between one of its agents and bin Laden
had taken place. Someone was lying. The question was who.
An
equally perplexing lead involved a US Navy Lieutenant, Delmart "Mike"
Vreeland, who was in a Toronto jail on US fraud charges at the time. Vreeland
claimed to be an officer in US Naval intelligence. The Navy initially denied
that, claiming that Vreeland never worked in intelligence and was discharged as
a seaman in 1986 for unsatisfactory performance.
In
any case, Vreeland reportedly wrote down details of a planned attack on the
World Trade Center in early August, placed his notes in a sealed envelope, and
handed it over to the Canadian authorities. Three days after 9/11, they opened
the envelope and discovered that Vreeland's description was correct.
Four
months later, on January 10, 2002, attorneys for Vreeland called the Pentagon's
switchboard operator from a speakerphone in open court. The operator confirmed
that Vreeland was a Naval Lieutenant on active duty. She even provided a phone
number and the extension for his office in the Pentagon.
Even
so, how did a Navy officer get such information, and how many others also knew
in advance? One person clearly in the loop was Zacarias Moussaoui, an Islamic
militant linked to bin Laden who was arrested by the FBI on August 17, 2001. A
key member of the Al Qaeda network, he had been taking flying lessons but
showed little interest in learning how to take off or land.
At
the time of his arrest, Moussaoui had technical information on Boeing aircraft
and flight manuals. An FBI agent warned his superiors that Moussaoui might have
been planning to "fly something into the World Trade Center." Even
this failed to set off a serious alarm. The CIA did know enough to offer a
detailed list of known terrorists to Saudi intelligence. But like those at the
top in the Bush administration, the Saudis ignored it.
Finally,
there was a warning from Russia. Based on reports he received, President
Vladimir Putin, a former KGB chief, ordered Russian intelligence in August to
tell the US government "in the strongest possible terms" that attacks
on airports and government buildings were imminent. Still, no action.
Afterward,
the Bush administration denied having any specific prior knowledge. But given
the available warnings, not to mention US plans to mount an attack on
Afghanistan, the failure to take effective preventive measures looked, at the
very least, like a case of willful disregard.
The Eve of Disaster
As
summer 2001 waned, the fledging administration in Washington faced a growing
list of problems, both at home and abroad. Vermont Senator James Jeffords'
decision to leave the Republican Party in April altered the congressional
balance of power, putting much of the Bush domestic agenda in jeopardy.
Fast
Track trading authority had been stalled. Enron was about to implode. Europe
was breaking with the US on missile defense, trade, environmental policy, and
Latin American intervention. Protests challenging globalization were gaining
momentum worldwide. China and Russia were learning to cooperate, and NATO
looked like it might be obsolete. In late August and the first days of
September, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped nearly 900 points, which
increased speculation about a looming economic crash.
But the Bush administration had some information that the rest of the public did not. For example, it had just sent two US carrier battle groups into the Gulf of Arabia, just off the Pakistani coast. Meanwhile, about 17,000 US troops joined more than 20,000 NATO soldiers in Egypt for Operation Bright Star, while 23,000 British troops steamed toward Oman for Operation Swift Sword. In short, the people in charge knew a military engagement was imminent. What better way to change the dynamic?
But the Bush administration had some information that the rest of the public did not. For example, it had just sent two US carrier battle groups into the Gulf of Arabia, just off the Pakistani coast. Meanwhile, about 17,000 US troops joined more than 20,000 NATO soldiers in Egypt for Operation Bright Star, while 23,000 British troops steamed toward Oman for Operation Swift Sword. In short, the people in charge knew a military engagement was imminent. What better way to change the dynamic?
On
September 7, in a move that was either prescient or premeditated, the
president's brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, signed emergency executive
order number 01-261. It contained provisions allowing the Florida National
Guard to assist law enforcement and emergency management personnel in the event
of large civil disturbances, disaster, or terrorism. Had Jeb Bush heard
something, or was he just being cautious?
By
this time, the President certainly understood that an attack on US symbols,
probably involving hijackers, was just a matter of time. Attorney General
Ashcroft knew enough to begin using a privately chartered jet for security
reasons, even though he refused to increase the number of FBI counter-terrorism
agents.
Who
else knew, and how detailed was the information? Apparently, some interested
parties had specific enough information to purchase 4,744 put options
(speculation that a stock will go down) on United Air Lines (UAL) stock on
September 6-7. Only 396 calls were bought those two days. It was a dramatic,
abnormal increase in sales. Many of the puts were purchased through
Deutschebank/AB Brown, a firm managed until 1998 by the Executive Director of
the CIA, A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard.
Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Munich re, and AXA Re, an insurance firm that owned 25
percent of American Airlines, also purchased an unusually high number of puts
in the four working days before the attacks. On September 10, American Airlines
saw similar activity: 4,516 puts and 748 calls. No other airlines showed
similar trading. Three weeks later, at least $2.5 million worth of puts on
American and UAL stock remained unredeemed. A suspension in trading on the New
York Stock Exchange after the attacks had given the Securities and Exchange
Commission time to prepare if the owners showed up. Inexplicably, the puts were
600 percent above normal at a time when Reuters was reporting that
"airline stocks may be poised to take off." Someone felt certain
enough to place heavy bets that the two airlines would take a hit.
It
was the right wager. Early on that sunny Tuesday, September 11, after taking
off from airports in Newark, Boston and Washington DC for routine cross-country
trips, three American and United Airlines flights with fully-loaded fuel tanks
destroyed the world-famous Twin Towers of downtown Manhattan's World Trade
Center and a portion of the Pentagon. A fourth flight was forced to crash by a
group of brave passengers before reaching its destination, possibly the White
House.
Although
FAA and the military recognized within minutes that the planes had been
simultaneously hijacked and diverted off course shortly after 8:15, no one
notified Bush until 9:05. TV cameras captured his apparent lack of surprise. By
the time Air Force planes were scrambled to intercept at 9:30, it was too late.
Despite the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the National Command Authority
waited 75 minutes before responding. Soon afterward, US airports were shut down
for the rest of the day.
Within
hours, the FBI helped Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar fly members of the bin Laden
family out of the country.
A
week later, FBI Director Robert Mueller updated the press. "There were no
warning signs that I'm aware of that would indicate this type of operation in
the country," he claimed. It sounded reasonable at the time.
Back to Business
In
the weeks after 9/11, national mourning, frustration and anger, adroitly stoked
by the mainstream media, provided a more than adequate justification for the
military battle plan hatched months before. A worldwide campaign against
terrorism and an alleged "axis of evil" that included Iraq, Iran and
North Korea would have sounded needlessly militant or overly ambitious before
the attacks. Afterward, it was hard, even risky, to speak out against the call
to war. The order of the day was unity, and whatever the administration needed,
Congress (and the public) seemed willing to supply. As people often said at the
time, the world had changed.
After
suffered a precipitous drop, the Dow Jones Industrial Average recovered most of
its pre-attack losses by mid-October. Although still weak, and vulnerable to
negative earnings reports and bombshells about Enron's troubles, a crash had
been narrowly averted. But the magic bullet was a massive infusion of
government spending on defense programs, subsidies for "affected"
industries, and planned tax cuts for corporations. Wartime spending was in
fashion again.
Plans
to turn the Caspian basin into an alternative source of energy, especially if
oil deliveries from the Persian Gulf were blocked or suspended, were also
revived. For example, once Pakistan was engaged as a US ally (despite its
connections to Al Qaeda and other extremists), US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain
paid a call on the Pakistani oil minister. The war had barely begun, but the
outcome looked certain. "In view of recent geopolitical developments,"
she told the minister on October 10, Unocal's pipeline from Turkmenistan
through Afghanistan to the Pakistani coast is back on the table.
After
the Taliban was routed, the appointment of Hamid Karzai as interim leader of a
western-friendly Afghanistan provided the project with another boost. As Le
Monde revealed, Karzai was a former Unocal consultant and a long-term CIA
asset, just the kind of leader the oil companies hoped to see. Bridas was out,
Unocal was back in.
Bush
further increased the odds of success early in 2002 by appointing Zalamy
Khalilzad, a former Unocal employee, as his special envoy to the recently
invaded nation. It apparently did not matter that, four years earlier,
Khalilzad had been a Taliban booster, even writing op-eds for the Washington
Post.
It
took only a month to work out the details. On February 9, 2002, Pakistani
leader Musharraf and Afghan leader Karzai proudly announced an agreement to
"cooperate in all spheres of activity," especially the proposed
Central Asian pipeline. Pakistan was even prepared to subsidize some of the
costs, offering $10 million to help pay Afghani government workers.
During
the attack on Afghanistan, the Pentagon had used Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as
rear bases and aid corridors. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan hosted no troops, but
agreed to open airspace and airfields. By early 2002, experts were evaluating
the Tajik airfields as operational bases for future missions. Thousands of US
soldiers were deployed in former Soviet Central Asia, many of them on an
Uzbekistan airfield near the Afghan border. Uzbek President Islam Karimov, a
key ally, saw no need to set a deadline for their departure. It was easy to see
why; Uzbekistan had been promised up to $150 million in loans and grants.
Meanwhile, outside Kyrgyzstan's capital, military facilities were under
construction at Manas international airport, eventually to house up to 3000
troops. Slowly but surely, under careful western guidance, the region was being
militarily transformed.
As
usual, the policy goals were obscured. Speaking to Congress early in the year,
Elizabeth Jones, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs,
offered the official line: the administration envisioned a permanent US
presence that would boost economic development and sustain democratic reforms,
she said. Translation: more US investments and a bit less outright brutality.
Deputy
Defense Secretary James Wolfowitz was more direct. By upgrading its military
presence, he explained, the US wanted to send a message. It would not forget
its new friends.
At the same time, however, the administration was pushing to
scrap a Cold War-era law placing conditions on former Soviet republics' trade
relations, based on their human rights records. This also sent a message; in return
for loyalty, the US was prepared to cut local tyrants some slack.
With
Afghanistan a safe place for investments, the focus shifted to Georgia and the
BTC pipeline project, still the key to moving Azerjaijan's oil and gas to the
Turkish coast. Chevron and Halliburton were waiting in the wings. As US Caspian
envoy Stephen Mann explained, the US was willing to promote almost any pipeline
that bypassed Iran. (Energy companies were also exploring a section of the
Caspian claimed by both Iran and Azerbaijan). To keep the BTC pipeline on
track, Georgian Defense official Mirian Kiknadze told Radio Free Europe on
February 27, "The US military will train our rapid reaction force, which
is guarding strategic sites in Georgia -- particularly oil pipelines."
Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage, a former co-chairman of the US-Azerbaijan Chamber
of Commerce, also chimed in, emphatically re-affirming US support for the BTC
pipeline during a March 8 visit with Turkish premier Bulent Ecevit. Within
weeks, words were matched by funding: a $4.4 million aid package for
Azerjaijan, prominently featuring military support and hardware.
A
month later, more US military advisors began to arrive in Georgia, along with
10 combat helicopters. Officially, the objective was to help combat Islamic
radicals in the Pankisi Gorge, allegedly a safe haven for al Qaeda and their
Chechen allies. But as most Georgians, though not many US citizens, understood,
their main task was to protect US interests in Caspian oil and gas. With
Turkish air force operations due in Azerbaijan later in 2002, the US was actively
promoting a NATO-friendly axis to guard the BTC route and counter a potential
alliance between Armenia, Iran and, if relations ever turned sour, Russia.
Waging
war in Afghanistan did not destroy Al Qaeda or eliminate the threat of further
attacks. But it had driven the Taliban from power and cleared the way for a
pipeline. Across the region, US aid and military operations designed to prevent
obstructions elsewhere were rapidly put in place. At home, Bush surfed a wave
of patriotism that even the Enron scandal and charges of an "intelligence
failure" prior to 9/11 could not stop.
Access to Power
Understanding
the interests of energy companies, and how US influence can make a difference,
comes naturally for George W. Bush. Though his start as an oilman in the 1970s
was unimpressive, his father's presidential victory eventually made him an
asset for Harken Energy, a modest Texas oil company with large ambitions. By
January 1990, he was on the board, receiving generous consulting fees and
holding substantial stock.
The
timing was perfect: Harken had defied the odds by making an oil production
sharing deal with Bahrain. It gave the company the exclusive right to explore
for gas and oil off the shores of the Gulf island nation. If anything was found
near two of the world's largest gas and oil fields, Harken would have the
exclusive marketing and transportation rights.
For
a company that had never drilled an offshore well, the agreement was a
remarkable leap. But since Harken lacked sufficient financing to do the job
alone, a partnership was established with Bass Enterprises Production Company
of Fort Worth, Texas. The Bass family contributed more than $200,000 to the
Republican Party during the Bush I years. Nevertheless, only five months after
Harken's Bahrain deal, Bush suddenly sold most of his stock for $848,560, a
remarkable 200 percent profit. Another timely move.
A
week later, the company announced a $23 million loss in earnings, and less than
two months after that, on August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops moved into Kuwait.
Over
half a million US troops were deployed to the Gulf over the next six months,
while Harken stock lost 60 percent of its value. According to US News and World
Report, solid evidence suggests that Bush cashed out because knew the company
was facing trouble in advance. Harken obviously didn’t hold a grudge and
continued to provide generous payments for the younger Bush’s consulting
services throughout the 1990s. After all, once the Gulf War was over, the
Bahrain deal still held the promise of profits for those who stayed the course.
Bush II's executive brain trust was even more connected. Both his vice president and national security advisor worked previously with oil companies that had Caspian ambitions. Commerce Secretary Don Evans was the former CEO of Tom Brown, Inc., a mid-sized oil and gas outfit. Gale Norton, appointed Secretary of the Interior, began her career with the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank funded by oil companies and founded by her mentor and predecessor, the infamous James Watt. She also chaired the Coalition of Republican Environmental Advocates, a front group backed by BP Amoco and the Ford Motor Company. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham had auto company connections, and Attorney General Ashcroft received major contributions from ExxonMobil, BP Amoco and Enron during his failed 2000 bid for Senate reelection. After Enron's crooked books were exposed, Ashcroft had to recuse himself from the investigation. But he didn't back away from federal grand juries investigating bribery and corruption charges against ExxonMobil and BP Amoco.
Bush II's executive brain trust was even more connected. Both his vice president and national security advisor worked previously with oil companies that had Caspian ambitions. Commerce Secretary Don Evans was the former CEO of Tom Brown, Inc., a mid-sized oil and gas outfit. Gale Norton, appointed Secretary of the Interior, began her career with the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank funded by oil companies and founded by her mentor and predecessor, the infamous James Watt. She also chaired the Coalition of Republican Environmental Advocates, a front group backed by BP Amoco and the Ford Motor Company. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham had auto company connections, and Attorney General Ashcroft received major contributions from ExxonMobil, BP Amoco and Enron during his failed 2000 bid for Senate reelection. After Enron's crooked books were exposed, Ashcroft had to recuse himself from the investigation. But he didn't back away from federal grand juries investigating bribery and corruption charges against ExxonMobil and BP Amoco.
This
was not the first US administration to work closely with big energy. In the
days before laws regulating campaign finance, oil interests contributed half of
the $100 million used in Dwight Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign. His
victory assured the removal of federal control over domestic offshore oil, at
the time valued at about $40 billion. Republican control of the Federal Power
Commission was equally helpful to the gas end of the industry.
A
Rockefeller brother-in-law, Winthrop Aldrich, then Chair of Chase Manhattan
Bank, became Ambassador to Britain, a strategic posting that helped to
safeguard Standard Oil’s interests and keep an eye on overseas rivals. Robert
B. Anderson, manager of a Texas oil company and member of the National
Petroleum Council, was named to head the Navy Department, the country’s biggest
oil customer.
It
didn’t take long before access to oil led to covert action. Responding to Iran’s
nationalizing of the Anglo-Iran Oil Company, the only energy concern operating
there at the time, Eisenhower approved a plan to overthrow its defiant Prime
Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and install the young Shah of Iran. The argument
was that the 1953 operation, reportedly costing the CIA $19 million, saved the
country from a Communist takeover. But the main beneficiaries were the five
leading US oil companies, which were subsequently able to cut a deal for 50
percent of Iran’s “liberated” operations through a new international consortium
negotiated by the State Department.
In
other words, Afghanistan was not the first place where the interests of the
energy industry served as a powerful motivating factor for US intervention.
Even
the most clever schemes can have unintended consequences, however. Twenty-five
years after the Iranian coup, an anti-Western fundamentalist regime drove out
the Shah, setting off a major “oil shock” and fatally damaging the Carter
administration. The new Iranian regime posed a more serious long-term threat to
oil supplies and regional peace in general, than the one overthrown in 1953.
And
the Caspian Basin? There, a “war on terrorism” – really a battle for control
over resources – emboldened local tyrants who saw their tactical alliances with
the US as protective cover to pursue brutal agendas. By late May 2002, this
took the world to the brink of a nuclear exchange as Pakistan’s leadership (a
US ally in the Afghanistan operation and key player in pipeline politics)
threatened to use nukes in its protracted dispute with India in Kashmir.
Did
Bush and his team know in advance about plans to take down the World Trade Center?
Despite the denials, the jury will probably be out indefinitely. Yet, there is
little doubt that many people, in and out of government, expected a major
attack before it happened. Some may even have been counting on it. Without a pretext,
after all, it might have been difficult to convince the US public that it was
necessary to overturn a faraway regime, even one that systematically abused women
and executed people in a football stadium. This, of course, wasn’t the real point
of the campaign.
Then
again, neither was “bringing terrorists to justice.” The true objective,
established before any planes went down, was to control future supplies of oil
and gas. Whatever the risks and whoever might suffer, the road to el Dorado had
to stay open.
No comments:
Post a Comment